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In this paper I discuss the relation between Olive 
Schreiner's social context and the form of her fictional 
writing. It is not intended· as an interpretation of her 
work but rather represents a preliminary sketch of the 
social and political discourses which structured her 
environment. I suggest that for Olive Schreiner writing 
is not a means of representing a given reality. Instead 
writing itself is a constitutive act through which she 
attempts to articulate a subject which expresses the 
conflicts and contradictions of its social and political 
location. 
In the first section of the paper, I discuss Olive 
Schreiner's position as a woman in relation to the 
literary canon. I argue that the social discourses of 
femininity in the late nineteenth century attempted to 
exclude women from the realm of cultural and intellectual 
production. Looking at the work of/Herbert Spencer, the 
influential social philosopher who used scientific 
principles as the basis for his ideas about social order, 
I analyse the way in which Olive Schreiner rewrites his 
theory in order to make a space for women as cultural 
producers. -~·- --· 
In the second section I look at the dominant forms 
of the novel available to Olive Schreiner. The dominant 
mode of representation for metropolitan writers· was the 
realist novel and women writers such as George Eliot 
found it an extremely effective way of articulating their 
experiences. The other significant form of writing for 
Olive Schreiner was the colonial adventure story, the 
most popular way, in the nineteenth century, of· 
representing the colonial space. I suggest that Olive 
Schreiner's rejection of both these forms and her choice 
of the allegorical mode, can be understood in terms of 
the specificity of her position as a colonial woman 
writer. 
In the third section, I focus more closely on one of 
Olive Schreiner's texts, The Story of an African Farm in 
an attempt to illustrate how allegory allows Olive 
Schreiner to reorder the unstable colonial space. Both 
realism and the adventure novel, I argue, assume a 
coherent and unified self. The colonial context, I 
suggest problematises this sense of self as individualist 
agent and in the figure of Lyndall I see the limits of 




I would like to express my gratitude for the help given 
to me by my two supervisors: 
Dorothy Driver, for her useful and informed criticisms 
John Higgins for his stimulating and constructive 
discussion. 
I would also like to thank the Centre for Science 
Development and the University of Cape Town for their 
financial assistance. 




Note to the Reader 





2. Part 1: Framinq Olive Schreiner•s Fiction 
9 
3 Part 2: Reorderinq the World - Realism, Romance or 
Alleqory? 
28 






Slowly raising herself on one elbow, she took from 
the sail a glass that hung pinned there. Her 
fingers were stiff and cold. She put the pillow on 
her breast, and stood the glass against it. Then 
the white face on the pillow looked into the white 
face in the glass. They had looked at each other 
often so before. It had been a child's face once, 
looking out above its blue pinafore; it had been a 
woman's face, with a dim shadow in the eyes, and 
something which had said, 'We are not afraid you and 
I; we are together; we will fight, you and I.' Now 
tonight it had come to this. The dying eyes on the 
pillow looked into the dying eyes in the glass; they 
knew that their hour had come. (1984, 283-4) 
In this famous passage in The Story of an African Farm, 
Lyndall confronts for the last time her image in the 
mirror. This final gesture completes the sequence of 
looks which she exchanges with herself in the course of 
the narrative and the eyes close. The mirror is left at 
the end of her story reflecting the dead face which is 
described as "a thing of marvellous beauty and 
tranquillity". No longer animated by Lyndall's look, 
her face becomes, finally, pure image - a "thing" or 
object, no longer capable of subjectivity. This marks 
the end of Lyndall's ceaseless attempt to engage with the 
reflective identities proposed by the mirror, and her 
desire to escape the endless repetition of self which the 
mirror generates. In this essay I shall argue that 
Lyndall's complex and ambivalent relation to the mirror 
can be read as a figure for Schreiner's attempt to find a 
mode of novelistic representation which could articulate 
something of her situated experiences. The structures of 
identity constituted by the discourses available to her 
offered Schreiner no space from which to articulate a 
7 
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self which was not captured by the mimetic frame of 
reference. Schreiner's choice of the allegorical mode 
represents a significant departure from the dominant 
literary forms of representation of the late nineteenth 
century. In this paper, I wish to investigate this 
choice, analysing it in terms of the conception of self 
and identity proposed by Lyndall's interactions with the 
mirror. I argue that Schreiner's writing represents not 
only a resistance to the discourse of imperialism which 
constitutes South Africa as the space of exotic 
otherness, but also a contestation of the structures of 
identity implicit in realist representation. The unity 
of the reflective subject constituted by both forms could 
not enunciate the fractured reality of her experiences as 
a colonial woman. 
Fundamental to this is a recognition of Schreiner's 
challenge to the dominant empiricist idea of expression 
in language. For Schreiner, expression is not the facile 
agency of a given subject, secure in its discourse and 
social positioning. Expression precedes the subject; 
expression is the quest for subjectivity. 
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Part 1: Framinq Olive Schreiner•s Fiction 
I will begin this investigation by attempting to 
interpret Schreiner's extremely problematic place in the 
literary canon. What is it about Schreiner's writing 
that makes the critical response to it so ambivalent, at 
once affirming her potential brilliance and regretting 
her actual practice? In an attempt to understand this 
ambivalence, I have made extensive use of the valuable 
article by Christine Barsby, "Olive Schreiner: Towards a 
Redefinition of Culture". In this article, Barsby notes 
that "the story of South African criticism of Schreiner 
is ••• one 'full of enthusiasms and partial regrets' 
(Gray,199), in which the constant refrain is of 
unrealised or misdirected potential" (1989,19). Even 
Virginia Woolf and other early feminist critics seem to 
regard Schreiner's own evaluation of herself as "only a 
broken and untried possibility" as an accurate 
description of her life and work. 1 , It is only recently, 
Barsby claims, that a significant reevaluation of this 
interpretation of Schreiner has begun to take shape. 2 
Locating her own study as part of this process of 
1. Barsby mentions the work of Elaine Showalter, Dale 
Spender, Marion Friedmann and Veneta Colby. Each, she 
suggests voice a "sense of disappointment, either in 
their wish that Schreiner had acted and written 
differently, or more overtly in criticism of the 'loose, 
formless, rambling narrative' of African Farm as a 
'failure of art and technique' (Colby,62), or in the view 
of Schreiner as someone 'sadly underambitious' whose 
psychosomatic illness symbolised a 'perverse will to 
fail'"(1989,19). 
2. Barsby refers in particular the work of First and 
Scott with their ground breaking biography of Schreiner. 
She also mentions Kathleen Blake's Love and the Woman 
Question, and the work of Liz Stanley, Rachel Bau 
DuPlessis, Gerd Bjorhovde, Sandra Gibert and Susan Gubar. 
reevaluation, she begins by analysing the traditional 
works of criticism on Schreiner. 3 Their inablity to look 
beyond Schreiner's "failure" as a writer and her 
significance as an "Extraordinary Woman" 4 leads Barsby to 
the conclusion that "what is at stake in these recurring 
images of Schreiner as a "failed genius" is the 
difficulty of positioning her as a woman writer" 
(1989,19). 
Schreiner's position is necessarily defined by the 
specific historical and social discourses which 
structured her environment. An understanding of her 
position as a woman writer thus requires an analysis of 
the way in which the term "woman" was defined in the late 
nineteenth century. What were the real social 
possibilities for women, and how were these received and 
reworked in cultural discourse? To what extent did the 
dominant representations of femininity limit the 
inscription of women as producers of cultural meaning? 
Barsby writes that "the struggle of Schreiner's life and 
work is specifically the struggle against women's 
marginal position within culture" (1989,20). It seems to 
me that Barsby's use of the term "culture" here conflates 
two distinct though clearly interrelated categories. 
Culture can refer both to general social practices and to 
3. Barsby mentions in particular Ridley Beeton, Uys Krige 
and Richard Rive. 
4. Barsby takes this term from the work of E.P. Thompson 
who argues that "the female subject of biography is seen 
less as a significant intellectual or writer than as an 
'Extraordinary Woman', whose 'moral confusions and 
personal crises ... are always somehow more interesting 
than those of a man: they engross all other aspects of 
the subject"' ( 1989, 19) . 
the specific artistic activities of a particular period. 
It seems to me necessary, in investigating Schreiner's 
relation to culture, to make this distinction. 
Schreiner's position as a woman needs to be understood in 
relation to the social discourses and practices which 
structured her world, while her position as a woman 
writer requires an analysis of the way literary 
production was directed by the male-dominated canon. 
In a study entitled Fictions of the Female Self, 
Ruth Parkin-Gounelas examines the work of Olive Schreiner 
in relation to that of Charlotte Bronte and Katherine 
Mansfield, tracing the ways in which these three 
generations of novelists attempted to inscribe a 
specifically female selfhood. Yet in all three cases the 
fact of their gender seemed to stand between them and 
their desire to assume authorship. Each felt it 
necessary to assert for their writing selves an 
independence from a specifically feminine identity. In 
the case of both Bronte and Schreiner this took the form 
of writing under a male (or androgynous) pseudonym and 
insisting on or trying to insist on a masculine status 
for their words. For Schreiner, the term "man" seemed to 
indicate not a biological categorisation but rather a 
reference to ungendered humanity. Her pseudonym, Ralph 
Iron, can thus be read as an attempt to refuse the gender 
specificity which a feminine name would imply. Bronte's 
choice of the androgynous name, Currer Bell, seems to 
indicate a desire to escape gender classifications 
altogether, although it is clear that for her too the 
masculine was perceived as the umarked term. 5 Mansfield, 
working in the considerably less constrained atmosphere 
of the nineteen twenties nevertheless found it necessary 
to assert that she was to be thought of as a writer first 
and a woman after. Yet this need to speak the 
impersonal, objective, 'public' language of masculine 
discourse at once implicated them in a mode of 
representation which located women as silent others. 
Their desire to articulate the specificity of a female 
selfhood, the actual conditions of their existence, 
brought them into conflict with the discourse of the 
human and the universal, since feminine identity 
expressed a social and historical reality not a universal 
truth. They were thus engaged in a precarious 
enterprise, wishing to be evaluated without regard to to 
their gender, while at the same time developing in their 
writing a critique of precisely those gendered categories 
which provided only an extremely circumscribed space for 
the articulation of women's experiences. 
Romantic fiction which dealt with the suitably 
feminine matters of love, hope and disappointment was 
considered appropriate for women writers but the 
conventions of its form severely limited the subject 
5. Parkin-Gounelas gives examples of this impulse: "I 
wish you did not think me a woman. I wish all reviewers 
belived Currer Bell to be a man; they would be more just 
to him',Charlotte Bronte wrote to Lewes in 1849. Olive 
Schreiner, with a greater imperiousness born of 
confidence in dealing with male intellectuals, 
nevertheless insisted to Karl Pearson in the mid-eighties 
that she was 'not a woman, I am a man, and you are to 
regard me as such" (1991,22). 
matter it was allowed to engage with. 6 Personal and 
domestic matters were considered the proper domain of 
women's fiction. At the same time, the fact that it 
dealt only with personal concerns marked it as trivial 
and not worthy of serious consideration. To write as a 
woman meant to be associated with the marginal and 
trivial pursuits of the romantic or domestic fiction. 
Their decision, therefo~e, to write "as men" was an 
attempt to evade the predefinition of their work in the 
terms prescribed for it by their gender and it involved 
them in a complex negotiation with the dominant forms of 
literary production in order to define for themselves a 
space for women's writing. 
Traditional critical responses to Schreiner which 
characterise her as a "failed genius" can thus be 
understood as themselves failures to read Schreiner's 
writing as a struggle with dominant cultural forms. By 
focusing on her personality and describing her as an 
'extraordinary woman', they repeat the gesture of 
marginalisation which Schreiner, in both her life and her 
fiction, tried to counter. These critical responses to 
6. Karel Schoeman writes that: "As early as 1835 the 
American critic and feminist Margaret Fuller, author of 
Women in the Nineteenth Century and a friend of Emerson, 
referring to the distinction between the two sexes, cried 
out: 'I would not write like a woman, of love and hope 
and disappointment, but like a man, of the world of 
intellect and action•. Women authors of limited 
experience and education readily turned their hand to 
superficial love stories - romantic or sensational - of 
the kind Jane Austen parodied and George Eliot dismissed 
as •silly stories by lady novelists', and Olive Schreiner 
later remarked, 'How many women writers there are at the 
present day with a touch of genius but so pitifully 
small'(1991,409). 
'\ 
her writing can be seen as limited by their inability to 
recognise the way in which Schreiner was attempting to 
challenge the way in which women were positioned by the 
prevailing representations of society. The immense 
impact of social Darwinism meant that any rethinking of 
gender relations had to confront the influential reading 
of the biological distinction between male and female as 
the basis for a social division between a masculine realm 
of culture and feminine realm of nature. Barsby argues 
that for Schreiner the struggle against marginalisation 
takes the form of a determined effort to redefine culture 
in a way which transcends this nature /culture 
opposition. 
Despite her relative physical isolation in the 
colonial interior during the period in which she wrote 
The Story of and African Farm, Undine and at least part 
of From Man to Man, Schreiner's interpretation_of the 
world was shaped by the cu~~~nt jntellectual metropolitan 
debates about theology and e.voclution. Having abandoned 
the religious faith of her parents at an early age, she 
found in the work of Herbert Spencer an alternative means 
of making sense of the world. Ruth First and Ann Scott 
write that: 
Olive expressed what she had learnt from Spencer in 
characteristically Spencerian terms. 'He helped me 
believe in a unity underlying all nature,' she told 
Ellis: it was her formal introduction to scientific 
naturalism. Until then the Bible had been the only 
explanation available to her; now she learnt that 
'all matter was alive,' that the social order 
reflected a deeper biological order, that progress 
was not an accident but a necessity - indeed a law 
underlying the whole of organic creation {1989,59). 
For Schreiner the significance of Spencer's theory lay in 
its general assertion of an underlying unity which gave 
the universe a moral purpose. 7 She resisted, however, 
the particular way in which he interpreted his scientific 
data, and the conclusions he came to on the questions of 
racial and sexual inequalities. 8 When the social order 
is justified because it expresses the natural order of 
the universe, then the precise interpretation of the 
natural evidence becomes a crucial point of debate. 9 It 
is around this issue that Schreiner formulates her 
7. This is the main argument of Spencer's First 
Principles, published in 1862, and which, according to 
First and Scott, Schreiner read in 1871. Spencer's aim 
is to show how scientific laws pertaining to physical 
matter {the primary truths of "The indestructability of 
matter, "The continuity of motion" and "The persistence 
of force") and to biological data can be related to human 
society. In the conclusion he writes that: "if it be 
agreed that the phenomena going on everywhere are part of 
the general process of Evolution, save where they are 
parts of the reverse process of Dissolution; then we may 
infer that all phenomena receive their complete 
interpretation only when recognised as part of these 
processes" {1946,496). 
8. Berkman writes that Schreiner's egalitarian and 
integrationist political outlook meant that "she faced a 
quandary, one with which a minority of other late-
Victorian thinkers wrestled: Was there a way to reconcile 
one's egalitarian and pacifist social beliefs with the 
seemingly anti-thetical biological insights and 
deductions of Darwinian research" {1989,77). Berkman 
also mentions Peter Kropotkin and Frank Lester Ward as 
other thinkers concerned with the social implications of 
social Darwinism's biological deductions. 
9. Raymond Williams in his article "Social Darwinism" 
describes Kropotkin's alternative interpretation of 
natural data. He writes that: "Kropotkin, in Mutual Aid, 
in 1902, said in effect: 'Yes, let us indeed learn from 
the order of nature. If we look at nature we find it 
full of examples of mutual aid. Look at the herds of 
dear and of cattle. Look at the ants, look at the bees, 
look at all the social insects. We will find that 
everywhere there are examples of mutual aid.' Of course, 
this was co-operation within species. Most of the 
competitive theories had been based on a struggle between 
species, and then covertly applied to competition within 
one species - man" (1980,96). 
15 
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revision of evolutionary theory in Woman and Labour. 
Spencer argues that gender differences originate in a 
single "fundamantal need - adaptation to the paternal and 
maternal duties". For him, the differences between men 
and women result "from a somewhat earlier arrest of 
individual evolution in in women than in men; 
necessitated by the reservation of vital power to meet 
the cost of reproduction" (1961,341). In describing how 
this effects mental capacity, Spencer asserts that women: 
have somewhat less of general power or massiveness; 
and beyond this there is a perceptible falling-short 
in those two faculties, intellectual and emotional, 
which are the latest product of human evolution -
the power of abstract reasoning and the most 
abstract of the emotions, the sentiment of justice -
the sentiment which regulates conduct irrespective 
of personal attachments and the likes or dislikes 
felt for individuals (1961,341-2). 
Woman's capacity for reproduction necessarily places her 
closer to nature and the "instinctive" world of maternal 
nurturance. This emphasis on woman's close association 
/ 
with nature meant that she was perceived both as an 
embodiment of natural law and as a part of the dangerous 
and primitive forces which civilized society needed to 
control. Her perceived inability to conceptualize the 
abstract notion of justice, "the sentiment which 
regulates conduct irrespective of personal attachments", 
legitimated the regulation of her conduct by those in a 
more advanced position with the society. Within this 
scientific construction of femininity, woman's sexuality, 
in so far as it was directed towards reproduction, was 
part of the natural, biological order. Anything which 
went beyond the limits set by biological function was 
seen as dangerous and threatening to the greater good of 
the human race. Woman's social duty was, for the socal 
Darwinists, defined by the biological role she played in 
promoting the continuance of the race. 
Schreiner's awareness of the limitations of 
Spencer's theory can be seen in a letter to Ellis where 
she explains his influence on her thought: 
You ask me whether Spencer is to me what he was? If 
one has a broken leg and the doctor sets it, when it 
is set one may be said to have no more need of the 
doctor, nevertheless one always walks on his leg. I 
think that that is how it is with regard to myself 
and Herbert Spencer. I have read all his works 
since, some three or four times; now I read him no 
more. He helped me to believe in a unity underlying 
all nature; that was a very great thing. B.ut he has 
nothing else to give me now (1987, 37). 
What is important for Schreiner about Spencer's theory is 
that it provides a conceptual system for comprehending 
the world. The notion that there exists an underlying 
unity in all of nature provides a scientific source of 
meaning to replace religious belief. But Schreiner's 
interpretation of this natural order involves a 
substantial revision of Spencer's principles. 
In Women and Labour, Schreiner analyses the way in 
which the development of human society has altered the 
social roles available to men and women. She argues that 
women have always historically taken part in socially 
useful labour other than that narrowly defined by their 
maternal function. Yet in a pattern which appears to 
repeat itself through the ages she notes that woman's 
labour is constantly being eroded either by technological 
17 
advances or by the subjection of large groups of people 
into relations of servitude. 10 
Modern Victorian society, the product both of 
industrialization and of colonial expansion, offers a 
prime example of a social order in which women's 
traditional roles have been reduced and no new field of 
occupation has been opened to them. She writes that: 
"Slowly but determinately, as the old fields of labour 
close up and are submerged behind us, we demand entrance 
into the new. We make this demand not for our own sake 
alone, but for the growth and succour of the human race" 
(1975,30). Schreiner validates her demands for women's 
equal access to socially useful labour through an appeal 
to the notion of evolutionary progress. Women must be 
prevented from becoming parasitic entities on the social 
body because this would lead to the degeneration of the 
race as a whole. Schreiner's notion of sex parasitism is 
in direct opposition to Spencer's belief that the 
liberation of women from productive labour in Victorian 
society was a mark of its advanced civilization. For 
Spencer the refinement of women's labour to those areas 
associated with her biological function meant that all 
her resources could be directed towards this important 
task. What Spencer's analysis failed to take into 
account was the fact that it was only in middle class 
10. Schreiner writes that: "Behind the phenomenon of 
female parasitism has always lain another yet larger 
social phenomenon. It has invariably been preceded, as 
we have seen, by the subjugation of large bodies of other 
human creatures, either as slaves, subject races or 
classes" (1975,42). 
society that women could devote all their energies to 
reproduction and child rearing. In actual fact, the 
number of women engaged in productive labour was 
increasing, 11 a fact Schreiner was well aware of. In the 
introduction to Woman and Labour, Schreiner expresses 
concern about men's attitudes towards "that vast and 
always increasing body of women, who as modern conditions 
develop, are thrown out into the stream of modern 
economic life to sustain themselves and often others by 
their own labour; and who yet are there bound hand and 
foot, not by the intellectual or physical limitations of 
their nature, but by artificial constrictions and 
conventions, the remnant of a past condition of society" 
(1975,7). The opposition between nature and society here 
locates nature as the source of social reform. The 
"artificial constrictions and conventions" of the current 
social order exist because it has failed to accommodate 
-------------- -~-- ·~·--~~- ~ --~--·~·---'-,.-~-------. 
itself to the developments which have altered human 
society's relation to nature. 
Appealing to this eighteenth century conception of 
nature as the basis for social reform, Schreiner argues 
that "mother nature" should be the sole arbiter of 
11. Cynthia Russett, in her book Sexual Science. The 
Victorian Construction of Womanhood, writes that: "far 
from diminishing, the number of gainfully employed women 
were expanding by the year, and there was no sign that 
this trend would be reversed. In the light of that hard 
fact, any theory which identified the course of human 
evolution with the removal of women from the workplace 
was clearly more prescriptive than descriptive" 
(1989, 145). 
people's abilities. Barsby comments that: 
Schreiner's reference to a gendered concept of 
nature reveal[s] the co-existence of ideas about 
women's association with nature within the concept 
of nature as a guide for social reform. In terms of 
this dual definition of nature, women are seen as 
closer to an ideal natural state, at the same time 
as their "natural" traits are deemed to threaten 
social progress, make them unfit for political 
equality and necessitate their being subject to 
greater social control (1989,22). 
By characterising the social constraints and conventions 
as artificial and at odds with women's innate capacity to 
undertake labour beyond that associated with her 
reproductive function, Schreiner recuperates the notion 
of nature to validate her own project for social 
transformation. Yet in doing this she remains caught 
within the conventional social demarcation of the sexes 
which associates women with nature. Women remain in a 
contradictory position in relation to culture since it is 
contemporary culture which is perceived to impose the 
"unnatural" restrictions on women's activities. This 
identification of cultural structures as artificial, 
however, means that in Woman and Labour Schreiner does 
not take into account the constitutive effects of the 
social on women's subjectivity. Although her concept of 
sex parasitism identifies the debilitating psychological 
effects of economic dependence, it limits these effects 
to a particular class of women within society. By 
arguing that the cultural forms are outdated she offers a 
powerful motivation for their transformation. Yet there 
remains a significant gap between her programmatic vision 
for the future as expressed in Woman and Labour, and her 
20 
attempt to embody this vision in her fiction. Despite 
the fact that intellectually she could envisage a new 
order of society, her fiction is not about successful 
transformation but rather expresses the limits and 
contradictions of the available discourses on masculine 
and feminine identity. 
This latent pessimism about the possibility of 
individual transformation is also evident in certain 
sections of Women and Labour. In her article "Virile 
Womanhood: Olive Schreiner's narratives of a master 
race", Carol Barash points out that the imagery with 
which Schreiner depicts her New Woman tends to ref er her 
ultimately back to the role of motherhood. Barash 
compares two sections of the text in which Schreiner 
describes the New Woman. Initially she appears as a 
cathedral builder. Schreiner writes that: "It is through 
the labours of these myriad of toilers, each working in 
her own minute sphere, with her own small outlook, and 
out of endless failures and miscarriages, that at last 
the enwidened and beautiful relation of woman to life 
must rise". The use of the modal here suggests that the 
project of these cathedral builders, the transformation 
of woman's relation to life, is one which can only be 
achieved in the future. It is described in the present 
as consisting in an endless series of of "failures and 
miscarriages". In contrast to this image of women 
struggling towards a future transformation, Schreiner 
presents the "Teutonic woman", who is depicted as the 
leader of the womens's movement. She appears as powerful 
21 
figure precisely because of her ability to "give birth to 
men". Barash writes that: "Placed after images of 
"aborted" and "miscarried" creations, these women who can 
create sons compensate narratively for the imaginative 
births of feminist daughters who fail in the present 
moment" {1989,278). 
Women's failure in the sphere of cultural activity -
the building of the cathedral - marks the limitations of 
Schreiner's appeal to nature as the basis for social 
transformation. Women remain excluded from the 
successful production of cultural meaning beyond that 
associated with motherhood. 
Schreiner's valorisation of motherhood can thus be 
read as an attempt to recuperate for women a significant 
role in contemporary society. In what sense could 
motherhood be extended from its narrow biological 
definition to include the generation of social relations 
implicit in the notion of mothering? In Woman and 
Labour, she claims that women are characterised by an 
intrinsic pacifism. She writes that: 
Woman will end war when her voice is fully, finally 
and clearly heard in the governance of the states 
because on this one point, and on this one point 
almost alone, the knowledge of woman, simply as 
woman, is superior to that of man: she knows the 
history of human flesh; she knows its costs; he does 
not (1975,76). 
In describing the specifically feminine knowledge here as ---a knowledge of "the history of the human flesh", 
Schreiner seems to be appealing to a biological 
conception of maternity. It is woman's maternal function 
....___ - -·-·--- --
22 
which is responsible for her greater concern for human 
life. This appeal to and essentialist notion of 
womanhood distinguished by its nurturant amd life 
preserving disposition once again positions women 
according to the limits imposed by a biological 
interpretation of the maternal function. Yet in 
Schreiner's fiction motherhood is not represented as that 
which can provide her heroines with a fulfilling 
existence. In both Undine and The Story of An African 
Farm the heroines are forced into this role and in both 
--- -
cases the child almost immediately dies leaving the 
mother painfully scarred by the experience. Referring to 
Lyndall's refusal of marriage and the subsequent death of 
her daughter, Nancy Paxton suggests that it appears as if 
for Schreiner, "motherhood were too dangerous a ground on 
which to erect a defence of female 'equality'" 
(1988,572). 
It is only in From Man to Man that mothering is 
presented in a more positive light. Here it is Rebekah's 
role in socializing her children which is seen as 
fulfilling. Rebekah's motherhood is characterised by a 
desire to shape her children's consciousness in a way 
which is at odds with the social norms. The children are 
presented as the seeds of a new generation who will be 
able to transform society. Yet Schreiner's failure to 
complete this novel suggests that her vision of a new 
society was difficult to sustain in the face of the harsh 
social realities that confronted her. Barash writes that: 
"In all of Schreiner's heroines there are gaps between 
their best vision of of a new society and their 
entrapment in a Victorian world of separate men's and 
women's spheres which mark biology as destiny" 
(1989,274). 
24 
Schreiner's positive representation of motherhood in 
Woman and Labour is part of her vision for an ideal 
future. Her conception of "nature" as a powerful life 
force which overrides social convention recuperates this 
term for her own purposes. It becomes her way of 
ordering the world in a way which escapes the restrictive 
social conventions of Victorian society. But by 
appealing to nature in this way Schreiner fails to take 
into account the constitutive force of the social. If 
nature provides the basis for the correct social order, 
then the particular restrictions of Victorian society 
appear as misinterpretations of nature, artificial 
constructions which can have no real hold on the 
"natural" self. In her fiction, however, the social 
always proves to be more powerful than nature. Neither 
Lyndall nor Waldo's deaths are given any biological or 
"natural" explanation. Instead the cause of death seems 
to come about as a result of the reaching of a final 
social impasse. They have reached a final point in their 
attempts to transcend the society which contains them and 
they can go no further. Barash argues that these limits 
in Schreiner' s writing can be read as political·. She 
writes that: 
Her writing attempts to reveal necessary political 
change but can not embody those changes in fiction. 
However, such narrative limits can also be read as 
political truths: stories don't change until the 
social order changes; the act of writing political 
fiction involves straining against social 
constructs, enabling them to change (1989,270). 
For Parkin-Gounelas, the common project of Bronte, 
Schreiner and Mansfield to resist masculine discourse and 
inscribe a female subject into fiction provides a 
connection between these three writers which supersedes 
their geographical and cultural differences. She writes 
that "marginalisation, either social or geographical or 
both, tended, in fact, to go hand in hand with an 
authorial obsession with the inscription of selfhood. It 
is almost certainly no accident that two of the three 
women studied here were colonials and the third from 
Yorkshire, on the fringes only of the dominant cultural 
orthodoxy. All three were in a sense double exiles, both 
geographically and sexually "other" in the only culture 
they could identify as their own" {1991,23). 
Marginalisation becomes the characteristic condition of 
being a woman in any society, and the Yorkshire 
countryside is perceived as being as distant for a woman 
writer from the cultural centre as the colonies are. 
While this conceptualization draws attention to the 
fact that women lack access to the dominant cultural 
productions even within their own societies it tends to 
elide the particular constraints imposed by colonialism 
on anyone attempting to invent a sense of self outside of 
the prevailing discourses. Colonialism not only implies 
geographical distance and the consequent lack of access 
-- ------·---" 
to the centre of political and cultural power, it also 
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involves specific social and historical conditions which 
produced a particular relation to British culture based 
on the discourse of imperialism. In the article, "Three 
Women's Texts and a Critique· of Imperialism", Gayatri 
Spivak argues that any analysis of nineteenth-century 
fiction needs to take into account the constitutive 
effects of imperialism on cultural representation. 
Spivak argues that feminist criticism which valorises the 
female subject in nineteenth century women's writing 
needs to recognise the ways in which this individualist 
subject is predicated upon the project of imperialism: 
The broad strokes of my presupposition are that what 
is at stake, for feminist individualism in the age 
of imperialism, is precisely the making of human 
beings, the constitution and "interpellation" of the 
subject not only as individual but as 
"individualist". This stake is represented on two 
registers: childbearing and soul-making. The first 
is domestic-society-through-sexual-reproduction 
cathected as "companionate love"; the second is the 
imperialist project cathected as civil-society 
through-social-mission (1985, 244). 
/ 
Spivak's analysis involves a comparison between Charlotte 
Bronte's Jane Eyre and Jean Rhys's Wide Sargasso Sea. In 
the first novel, Spivak suggests, it is only through the 
sacrifice of Rochester's first wife, the mad colonial in 
the attic, that Jane can assume the position of subject. 
The conclusion of this novel is the triumph of 
"companionate love" and the female individualist subject 
takes her place within the metropolitan social ~rder. 
Rhys's novel, written in 1965, shifts the emphasis of 
story from Jane to Bertha Mason, tracing her history as a 
white creole in the carribean caught between metropolitan 
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and indigenous political and cultural forces. Spivak 
sees Wide Sargasso Sea as a form of limit text, one which 
both indicates towards the madness, both actual and 
political, which has to be excluded for the female 
individualist subject to take up her place, and yet 
cannot itself articulate a position for the colonial 
subject. 
I have introduced this comparison here in an attempt 
to theorise the impossibility of the individualist female 
subject in the colonial context. In interpreting 
Schreiner's writing in terms of a common concern of woman 
writers to articulate a specifically female self, Parker-
Gounelas fails to recognise precisely how problematic the 
very conception of self is for Schreiner. In the 
following section, I will argue that it is this anxiety 
about a self, not only female and consequently marked by 
gender in social discourse, but also colonial, caught 
between an exclus~ve metropolitan conception of humanity 
and an oppressed indigenous population, which shapes the 
form of Schreiner's writing. 
' 
a function of subjects, of observers - of what is 
desired and what needs to be known. A knowable 
community, that is to say, is a matter of 
consciousness as well as of evident fact. Indeed it 
is to just this problem of knowing a community - of 
finding a position, a position convincingly 
experienced, from which community can begin to be 
known - that one of the major phases in the 
development of the novel must be related (1987,17). 
Although the confident realism of the eighteenth century 
which Lukacs describes is significantly altered by the 
changing social condition, the work of late nineteenth 
century novelists remain realist in that their concern is 
still to represent social reality in a coherent form. 
For George Eliot, society may represent a tangled web but 
it is still the space in which individuals enact their 
mutual interdependence, and the substance from which a 
novelist may derive a moral order. 12 
It is this conception of writing as an act of 
conscious interpretation which Schreiner distances 
herself from in a letter she writes to Havelock Ellis in 
1889. She writes: "No human creature's feelings could 
possibly be further removed with regard to artistic work 
- not of course the scientific - than mine from George 
Eliot's. Her desire was to teach, mine to express 
myself, for myself and to myself alone" (1987, 154). 
Although in Eliot's writing, the confident claim of early 
realism to represent the truth through an accurate and 
adequate depiction of the real was countered by a growing 
12. Raymond Williams refers to Eliot's frequent use of 
the metaphors of network, tangle and web to describe 
social relations. He suggests that while 'network, we 
might say, connects; the web, the tangle, disturbs and 
obscures'. Eliot's writing seem to be caught in the 






Part 2: Reordering the World - Realism, Romance or 
Allegory? 
"Compositional principJ .. ~es_ar_e a manifestation of an 
author's view of life" {19~5, 140). This comment by 
- -
-Lukacs is made as a preface to his discussion of realist 
writers and their ability to successfully represent the 
world as a coherent totality. Unlike naturalist writers 
who can only observe and describe, realist writers (the 
example he chooses is Walter Scott), because they are in 
possession of a "vital ideology", are able to view "the 
contradictions of life in a fruitful, ordered context". 
For Lukacs, the goal of the realist writer is "to 
penetrate the laws governing abstract reality and uncover 
the deeper, hidden, mediated, not immediately perceptible 
network of relationships that go to make up society" 
(1980,38). It is clear that by the late nineteenth 
century, the social conditions which had provided the 
substance of the writing of eighteenth century authors 
/ 
like Jane Austen and Walter Scott had changed 
considerably. Raymond Williams argues that for novelists 
writing in this period perhaps the most significant 
question generated by the social transformations which 
were taking place had to do with the conception of a 
"knowable community". The new urban and industrial 
society meant not only rapid changes in the external 
world but also in the the way in which individ~als could 
conceptualize their position in relation to that society. 
Williams writes that: 
.•. what is knowable is not only a function of 
objects - of what is there to.be known. It is also 
sense of the unknowability of society, it nevertheless 
provided a definite interpretation of real social 
conditions. It undertook the increasingly difficult, if 
not impossible task of demonstrating to its readers the 
actual relations which underlay everyday existence. It 
is this promise to reveal the coherence of social reality 
that lends such fiction its didactic quality. Schreiner 
contrasts Eliot's desire to teach, with her own desire to 
express, suggesting that for Eliot the world existed as 
something known to be conveyed to her readers. While 
Schreiner's understanding of Eliot's project seems to 
miss the considerable struggle which the communication of 
this precariously grasped knowledge represented, her 
distinction between didactic and expressive art is 
significant. _For ~C?_hr_ein_er., :the ap_t, _of ~x~ression in 
itself is important: it is not the expression of a given, 
stable, self but the constitution in and_~hrough 
expression of a new self. The letter to Ellis reveals 
the extreme anxiety which Schreiner felt when exposing 
her writing to an audience13 . The extremely personal 
nature of her writing is one of the things which 
distinguishes it from Eliot's ironic, impartial 
narrative. While Eliot may have struggled to conceive of 
an ordered reality within the increasingly eroded society 
of the late nineteenth century, she was nevertheless able 
to distance herself from the "tangled web" sufficiently 
13. Schreiner writes: "It was like a knife in my heart 
today when I saw An African Farm stuck up in a window. I 





to regard it as exterior to herself. It is this distance 
which Schreiner seems unable, or perhaps unwilling to 
maintain. Her writing self seems somehow implicated in 
the world she is trying to represent. 
In a letter to Havelock Ellis in 1886, Schreiner 
writes: 
Every word of it (From Man To Man] is truth to me, 
and more and more so as the book goes on. It could 
not be otherwise. That is all that can be said of 
it. one thing I am glad of is that it becomes less 
and less what you call 'art' as it goes on. My 
first crude conceptions are always what you call 
'art'. As they become more an more living and real, 
they become what I call higher art but what you call 
no 'art' at all {1987,79). 
The distinction here is between Schreiner's novel which 
is "truth to (her)" and "art". The term "art" here can 
be read on one level as simply the conventions of 
representation established by the literary canon, 
conventions which Schreiner's writing did not conform to. 
Yet on another level "art" can refer to the conscious 
, 
crafting of the material by the artist, an act which can 
only be undertaken if the artist perceives herself as 
clearly separate from material she wishes to represent. 
Realist fiction establishes the world as exterior, and 
mediates the experiences of individuals so that they 
become understandable in terms of the wider historical 
dynamics of the time. This ordered exterior world is one 
which cannot approximate to Schreiner's experience of the 
"living and real", a phrase which indicates that for 
Schreiner, personal lived experience could not be 
separated from the exterior world. This "art" which 
claims to reveal the impersonal or objective truth 
through showing the actual relations between things, 
events and people cannot accomodate Schreiner's novel 
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which is true only in its specificity. Its truth is not 
general but relates to the specificity of Schreiner's 
experiences. These experiences, located in a 
geographical and social space other than that ref erred to 
in traditional realist fiction, could not be interpreted 
according to the kinds of relations set up by 
metropolitan conceptions of the real. 
Karel Schoeman writes that "with the three novels 
she wrote in the seventies, and specifically The Story of 
an African Farm, which was published in 1883, Olive 
Schreiner became the founder, or at any rate the 
initiator, of a literature that was not merely written in 
South Africa or by South Africans, nor merely contained 
South African characters, scenes or themes, ~l'!_y.r~ich 
South Africa was an essential element" (1989,413). Prior 
I 
to her representation, he argues, South Africa was either 
described in terms transposed from a British or European 
setting or it was exoticised-in the form of the colonial 
-adventure or romance. 14 While realism was the dominant 
literary form for metropolitan writers representing their 
own context, England, the most popular way of 
14. Schoeman describes how Pringle and other early poets 
attempt to name the Southern African landscape ~n the 
conventional terms used to write about British and 
European landscapes (1991,414-420). He also suggests 
that "as a land of potential adventure, Africa lent 
iteself to youth literature, and since it was also a 
missionary country it offered the wherewithal for a very 
effective blend of entertainment and edification •.• " 
(1991,417). 
I 
representing her colonial empire was the adventure story 
or colonial romance. 
Writing about the distinction between the social-
psychological or realist novel and the adventure novel, 
Bakhtin notes that the difference lies in the relation of 
the hero to the social whole. In the classic realist 
account, he suggests, social relationships form the 
stable basis determining all plot connections. 
The hero is assigned to a plot as someone fully 
embodied and strictly localized in life, as someone 
dressed in the concrete and impenetrable garb of his 
class or social station, his family position, his 
age, his life and biographical goals. His humanness 
is to such an extent made concrete and specific by 
his place in life that it is in itself denied any 
decisive influence on the plot relationships 
( 1984 I 104) • 
In the adventure novel, the hero is constituted in an 
entirely different way. In this genre "all social and 
cultural institutions, establishments, social states anq 
classes, family relationships are no more than positions 
in which a person can be eternally equal to himself. 
Problems dictated by his eternal human nature - self-
preservation, the thirst for victory and triumph, the 
thirst for dominance or for sensual love - determine the 
adventure plot" (1984,105). For the popular writer, the 
suitability of the adventure novel to the colonial 
......--=---~=-=-~....---
situation is precisely its reference to the notion of an 
(~:~;~?})~~;:~ ;:;~~e .. ~~I~ ;~-this notion whi~h-can - . 
provide fictions about colonial Africa with a means of 
representing an encounter with a space in which stable 
social relationships do not appear to exist. The 
' 
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"eternally human" hero can leave behind the cultural and 
social institutions of British society and confront the 
otherness of the alien environment without ever losing 
his sense of himself. In fact the adventure narrative 
functions to consolidate the sense of an autonomous self 
through representing the hero as able to function outside 
the boundaries of his social network. 
For Schreiner, as a colonial woman, there were 
problems associated with the discursive fields generated 
by both the realist and the adventure novel form. The 
social-psychological novel of the kind being produced by 
George Eliot could draw on the notion of a historically 
situated and relatively stable community in which the 
characters were located according to commonly known class 
and religious divisions. Colonial society, made up of 
settlers from a variety of different countries, classes 
and religions lacked the relative homogeneity of an 
English town such as that represented in Middlemarch. 15 
Furthermore, it had only a short and fragmented history 
which was unable to provide an adequate basis for a sense 
of a colonial social identity. Graham Pechey remarks 
that a homology can be posited between "the 
discontinuities in the great Text of colonial culture and 
those in the text of African Farm itself" (1983,66). 
These discontinuities in colonial culture meant that 
15. Willaims writes that in Middlemarch: "George Eliot 
refers to the real processes within this sort of society 
- the steady rise and fall of families - as 'those less 
marked vicissitudes which are constantly shifting the 
boundaries of social intercourse and begetting new 
consciousness of interdependence'. This is a changing but 
still knowable community" (1987,90). 
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Schreiner, from German and English missionary parents, 
living within a fragmented community, occupied an uneasy 
relationship with the stable society presumed by the 
social-psychological novel. While English society 
provided a model of class and gender divisions, it could 
not adeqately encapsulate the heterogeneity of the 
colonial population. 
In her preface to African Farm, Schreiner identifies 
two methods of depicting reality: 
Human life may be painted according to two methods. 
There is the stage method. According to that each 
character is duly marshalled at first, and ticketed; 
we know with an immutable certainty that at the 
right crisis each one will return and act his part, 
and when the curtain falls, all will stand before it 
bowing. There is a sense of satisfaction in this, 
and of completeness. But there is another method -
the method of the life we all lead. Here nothing 
can be prophesied. There is a strange coming and 
going of feet. Men appear, act and re-act upon each 
other and pass away. When the crisis comes the man 
who would fit it does not return. When the curtain 
falls no one is ready ••• What the name of the play is 
no one knows (1984,27). 
While Schreiner's claim is also to a form of realism, it 
is not a mimetic realism which satisfies us by 
reconfirming our sense of the world as ordered according 
to understandable and familiar sets of relations. 
Instead it offers the disturbing incompleteness of a body 
not whole and firmly situated in the world, but 
fragmented, unexplained and in flux, articulated in the 
image of the strange coming and going of feet. The novel 
itself thus does not claim to mirror the world in so far 
as mirroring involves the production of a accurate, 
completed picture which presents for the reader an 
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already known world of stable social relationships. It is 
the strangeness of the real, and its resistance to the 
ordering process of a realist narrative that she 
emphasizes. It is an act which cannot be named, in which 
the actors lack stable identity, and in which the plot 
cannot be predicted. The discontinuities in her 
narrative are the discontinuities of the form of life she 
is trying to articulate. 
The narrative that she does offer in African Farm is 
one which she needs to defend because it does not conform 
to the expectations produced by its geographical 
location. The "kind critic" whom she quotes in the 
preface "would better have liked the little book if it 
had been a history of wild adventure; of cattle driven 
into inaccessible 'kranzes' by Bushmen; 'of encounters 
with ravening lions, and hair-breadth escapes.'" The 
appeal of the adventure novel, the form which dominated 
narratives about South Africa, lay in the fact that it 
mapped onto the alien and exotic terrain of the "kranzes" 
a familiar discourse of metropolitan encounters with the 
wilderness. The colonial real would have become 
·'<--...... - --
readable and comprehensible as a space in which western 
man might reconfirm his own position of dominance, since 
the adventure story is always one in which the hero 
triumphs finally over a hostile environment. At the same 
time, Paul Rich points out, 'while realism tends toward a 
scientific world view in its observation of outward and 
worldly social forms, romance has a regressive and 
primordial tendency of looking towards inward 
psychological states and worshipping the heroic and the 
marvellous" (1986,122). 
While the representation of South Africa in the 
colonial romance might not have been considered "true", 
its effect was to consolidate a conceptualization of 
Western man in terms of a notion of "eternal humanity". 
Whereas the adventures themselves might lack grounding in 
reality, the claim to truth of th~se nqv_els_lay in_their 
~-- .... ·-=-=--=~~-r--o=--~---=~- --=~~=--=- -·---=--=-- --- -· -
psychological investigation of the self. The fantasied 
confirmation of the integrity of an autonomous and self-
sufficient man created an identity which was not 
dependent on established social relationships. Precisely 
because colonial society lacked a homogeneous and stable 
character, the heroic adventurer was able to use the 
colonial space as one in which to authenticate the notion 
of an eternal human nature. But this notion of the 
eternal human nature of the heroic adventurer is one 
which excludes women entirely since confirmation of that 
self is to be found in the traditionally male activities 
of self-preservation and struggles for victory and 
domination. Rich writes that "in its strictest form, the 
romantic ideal can have no place for the autonomy of the 
female mind which had an ambiguous and ultimately 
threatening status" (1986,124). The women in adventure 
stories always remain to __ ~he s!:de of the_ main action, as 
goals to be reached or threats to be overcome. There is 
no room for them to occupy the position of subject since 
they are by definition not part of eternal humanity, but 
rather elements in the social network which the men 
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escape in order to rediscover themselves. Schreiner 
comments in response to the suggestion that her novel 
-~ ~-0 ----- ==----~- -·· 
would have been more . appeal-ing ·.if it· been an adventure 
romance that "such works are best written in Piccadilly 
or the Strand". ~plicit in this remark is an awareness 
of the extent to which such a discourse is dependent on a 
particular positioning of the writer in relation to the 
colonial realitJ To write such a narrative presupposes 
the writer's emotional distance from the strangeness of 
that reality. The author, like the adventurer, must 
inhabit a stable and familiar social space which he can 
temporarily leave behind in his fictional exploration of 
the exotic and the unknown. It is this social space that 
provides him with a discourse which constitutes colonial 
Africa as other and strange and at the same time 
penetrable and conquerable. Refusing to adopt the 
metropolitan discourse of adventure and conquest, 
Schreiner was confronted with the necessity of finding a 
mode of representation which can maintain the strangeness 
of the familiar reality of "the scenes among which [s]he 
has grown". It is her actual familiarity with South 
Africa which prevents her from being able to read or 
write it in the terms provided by the colonial adventure 
story. For Pechey, the discontinuities of the novell~i~s. 
reversal of categorical expectations, can be related to 
Schreiner's refusal to reproduce the dominant discourse 
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about South Africa. He argues that: 
To return this text to its colonial historical locus 
is to see that these various scandals (aesthetic, 
ethical, and religious) have as their basis a yet 
more fundamental cultural reversal which is at 
bottom political. In this reversal priority is 
conferred upon the colony rather than the metropolis 
- the second rather than the first term of the 
colonial relationship. The "strange" place is home. 
Where one starts from. The exotic is the familiar; 
both in space and time the movement is from the farm 
towards what is called civization rather than from 
civilization to the savage hinterland of 
contemporary colonial romance (1983,3). 
These reversals mark Schreiner's resistance to the forms 
through which colonial space had been inscribed and 
generates a mode of representation which attempts to 
avoid the implications of both the realist and the 
adventure novel forms. 
Schreiner's awareness of the distinction between her 
writing and the dominant conventions of literary 
production of the period can be seen in a letter to Ellis 
in 1886. Schreiner writes: 
You seem to say "I will call 'art' only that 
artistic creation in which I clearly see the artist 
manufacturing the parts and piecing them together; 
when I cannot see that, though the thing be organic, 
true, inevitable, like a work of God's, I will not 
call it art ••. " This touches what seems to me a 
weakness and shallowness in your mode of criticism. 
It is very valuable that the two kinds of art should 
be distinguished, but not that one be called art and 
the other not art. It would be better to call one 
artifical and the other real art. But that wouldn't 
be just. I should rather call the one organic and 
the other inorganic. (1987,79) 
With the notion of "organic" art Schreiner attempts to 
define a mode of artistic representation which derives 
its form, not from contemporary literary conventions but 
from a correspondence with the natural order. Arguing 
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that the initial stages of the creative process were 
largely unconscious, she asserted that the material which 
emerged was already associated with a particular form. 
The conscious art of writing· lay in ensuring that the 
material text provided an accurate representation of her 
initial vision. 16 The unconcious is thus located as the 
origin of a natural truth, as inevitable as a "work of 
God's". For Schreiner, this truth is not a personal or 
subjective truth because the unconscious is not a product 
of the individual mind. It is rather the natural force 
which allows people to move beyond their individual 
consciousness. Drawing on an interview with Schreiner's 
friend, Arthur Symons, and the discussion between Rebekah 
and Drummond on art in From Man to Man, Berkman asserts 
that: 
Though the substance of an intuition is construed 
from an artist's lived experience •.• it represents 
more than the artist's particular life. The ability 
to dream, hear, see objects unknown to the artist's 
actual life arises form "the accumulated life of his 
race, of the millions of human creatures who have 
been his ancestors," to which he adds his unique 
ability, organically connected with the entire 
complex of human experience, to paint the future. 
(1989,202) 
The unconscious is thus conceptualized as both a natural 
and a social force which unifies the diversity of 
individual experience. Since organic art, for Schreiner, 
represents an expression of unconscious material it acts 
16. This is discussed in Berkman,(1989,198-206). She 
writes that "Schreiner was certain that creative flashes 
sprang primarily from unconscious processes" (1989,199) 
and goes on to explain how Schreiner, in a letter to 
Ellis, describes an incident which "provides new strange 
evidence of that double consciousness which I'm sure 
exists in the brain, at least in mine." 
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as a means of transcending individual consciousness and 
revealing the links which bind human society. The form 
or style of the writing is_structured by the inner 
constraints of the unconscious material. The 
heterogeneity of styles of writing in her novels, 
particularly African Farm and From Man to Man, is thus 
explained, in Schreiner's terms, as the result of 
structuring force of an unconscious, unifying principal 
within human society. 
The mode of representation which for Schreiner seems 
to most adequately fulfill the requirements of this 
double vision, both actual and discontinuous, 
transcendent and unified is the allegory. In African 
Farm, there are two actual allegories which break the 
continuity of the narrative progression. Parker-Gounelas 
argues that in addition to this "the novel itself can be 
read as one long sustained allegory, woven out of the 
-··--
tangle of its elements. Deeply burjed behind the stories 
of Lyndall, Em and Waldo is a narrative about gender 
conditioning as Schreiner knew it, and a specific 
programme for the solution to the problem of sexual 
polarisation" (1991,102). For Parker-Gounelas, the 
figure of Gregory Rose provides the focus for an 
imaginary resolution of the conflict engendered by the 
social construction of sexual difference. She writes 
that "in Gregory, the new womanly man, Schreiner· embodies 
her view of how a transformation in male attitudes could 
bring about a new era in human relationships" (1991,105). 
Apart from the curious way in which this interpretation 
emphasis of the novel from an investigation of female 
agency (the inscription of female selfhood) to the 
assertion of the tranformative power of male attitudes, 
it is hard to identify where in the allegorical structure 
she finds evidence of the "new era of human 
relationships". Surely not in the relationship between 
Em and Gregory Rose after his transforming experience of 
being a woman. Em's conversation with Waldo does not 
seem to indicate that their relationship represents the 
"utopian" expression of transformed human relationships: 
"Why is it so, Waldo, always so?" she said; "we long 
for things, and long for them, and pray for them; we 
would give all we have to come near them, but we 
never reach them. Then at last, too late, just when 
we don't want them any more, when all the sweetness 
is taken out of them, then they come (1984,296). 
It is her marriage to Gregory Rose which has come too 
late, when it no longer represents the fulfillment of her 
prayers. It is difficult to see where in this painful 
representation of loss Parker-Gounelas finds the 
"fantastic, utopian conception" she attributes to 
Schreiner. 
Irene Gorak, in an article entitled "Olive 
Schreiner's Colonial Allegory: The Story of an African 
Farm", presents a rather more complex reading of African 
Farm as an allegorical text. Gorak offers her reading of 
the novel as an investigation into the possible 
recuperability of allegory in progressive social 
narrative. She argues that: "at the back of Schreiner's 
novel lurks a half-examined link between allegory and 




between different orders of experience; the second a kind 
of nightmare comparison, proceeding by physical as well 
as verbal expropriation, between two cultures, a 
"higher", colonizing power, and a "lower", less developed 
culture, to be attacked, absorbed, emptied, and cast 
aside" (1992,56). For Gorak, both allegory and 
colonialism involve two distinct fields of experience 
which are brought together in a systematic ordering of 
relations. 
In the novel, all the characters are involved in the 
process of producing stories or images which engage with 
the dominant discourses of the metropolitan culture. The 
colonial writer, caught between the metropolitan culture 
on the one side and indigeneous culture on the other, 
finds herself unable to sustain a singular interpretative 
strategy. Gorak writes that: 
European settlers mirror the ideals of a parent 
society in an environment that undermines their code 
of dress, work, and behaviour, their moral and 
religious pieties. Partially adapting to local 
conditions, the same settlers also mirror their new 
environment, borrowing the long-evolved adaptive 
behaviour of the native people - the shoes they 
wear, the materials for their houses, crops raised 
and animals herded - even as they impose on those 
people their own imported valuations" {1992,62). 
The use of the image of the mirror here seems 
incompatible with Gorak's own analysis of the partial and 
fragmented relationship the colonial writer has with both 
the parent society and the culture of the indigeneous 
communities. The action of the mirror is to reflect 
indiscriminately whatever comes before it. It is 
incapable of selection. Mirroring became the metaphor 
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for realist representation precisely for these reasons. 
Gorak goes on to argue that in African Farm, the 
allegorical meanings coexists with literal meanings. 
Waldo, Lyndall and the other· characters are allegorical 
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figures but also "suffering, and separated bodies", whose 
pain is not alleviated by the spiritual resolution they 
f igurally indicate. According to Gorak: 
The figural centre of Schreiner's fiction is the 
body, often the female body, a mountain trodden by 
alien species and stamped into a bewildering variety 
of sizes. and shapes. In African Farm, the topiary 
world of the female body merges into the world-in-
f lux of the colonial farm. Both attract dominating 
powers ignorant of the real needs of the territory 
claimed. Both propitiate cultural interests 
formulated and fed elsewhere. As the colony stand 
to the metropolis and the allegory stands to the 
encoded truth, so the female stands to the male 
(1992,67). 
Gorak's interpretation thus goes beyond that offered by 
Parker-Gounelas since it attempts to show how, through 
the use of allegory, the novel constructs a double 
( '. ( ., 
narrative. She reads it as representing simultaneously \: 1 
an account of women's oppression and of colonial 
domination. Yet in the final sentence, Gorak seems to be 
~more complex relation between the allegorical 
form of the novel and the material it represents. By 
suggesting a~analogy between the relationship of colony 
to metropolis, allegory to encoded truth and female to ---
male, she seems to be suggesting that the allegorical 
---=:.____ 
form itself figures the unequal power relations evident 
in the other two relationships. For Gorak, allegory 
relat.es two separate fields of experience in a 
hierarchical way, making the tale or fable secondary to 
the truth which it encodes. At the same time she seems 
to be suggesting that in allegory, as in the 
colonial/metropolitan or female/male relationship, it is 
impossible to maintain an absolute separation between the 
two domains of meaning. 
In Catherine van Dyke's reevaluation of the trope of 
allegory she observes that it can be defined as realist 
according to an older definition of the real "not as 
imitative or commonsensical but as substantial, in 
Platonic terms". 17 It deals not in the appearances of 
reality but in a hidden, transcendent reality which it 
indicates indirectly through fable. 18 Angus Fletcher 
argues that: 
Allegory perhaps has a "reality" of its own, but it 
is certainly not the sort that operates in our 
perceptions of the physical world. It has an 
idealizing consistency of thematic content, because, 
in spite of the visual absurdity of much allegorical 
images, the relations between the ideas are under 
strong logical control (1965,105). 
According to Cherry Clayton, it is this aspect of 
allegory which appealed to Schreiner. In the 
introduction to a collection of Schreiner's short fiction 
she writes: 
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Allegory offered Schreiner a traditional way of 1~ 
approach to abstract truth, a way of transcending j \!t) 
17. Stephen Barney quoted in Van Dyke, (1985,39). 
18. Plato argues that the artist can deal only with 
appearances: "the poet knowing nothing more than to 
represent appearances, can paint in words his picture of 
any craftsman so as to impress an audience which is 
equally ignorant and judges only by the form of the 
expression" (1941,331) Fletcher argues that Plato's 
tendency toward allegory "can perhaps be ascribed to a 
major need in the Platonic system, for permanent images 
to convey the fixed idea with which the dialectical 
argument is going to operate"(1964,99). 
individual lives and propounding what she saw as 
universal principals and ethical imperatives 
(1986,8). 
Schreiner's desire to represent "abstract truth" can be 
understood both in terms of her relation to the 
metropolitan culture and her uneasy position as a woman 
writer. Through asserting a human or universal truth 
underlying the apparent world, Schreiner could transcend 
the fragmented and often indecipherable reality of the 
colonial environment. The allegorical t~ope, with its 
ability to maintain ~wo separate levels of meaning, _99u~4~ 
be used to derive a systematic order from the chaotic 
details of individual experience. It provided the 
crucial means of connecting contradictory cultural 
discourses with an underlying system of natural 
relations. At the same time as allegory provided 
Schreiner with a means of transcending the local and 
allowing her access to the metropolitan culture it also 
afforded her an entry into the traditionally masculine 
realm of conceptual debate. Allegory offered her the 
possibility of transcending the particularity of her 
social position as a colonial, woman writer allowing her 
to take up the authoritative role of mediator, revealing 
though her writing universal human truths rather than 
merely mirroring her own conditions of experiences. 
Yet in order for allegory to fulfill its ordering 
function it is essential that the two levels of meaning 
on which it operates remain separate. The unambiguous 
truth of the revelation must be kept apart from the 
fictitous, indeterminate fable in which it is encoded. 
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Van Dyke argues that this is precisely what allegory 
ultimately cannot achieve. She writes that "if a text 
says one thing it also means that thing: we cannot 
separate speech from meaning. Thus if it says one thing 
and means another, it both says and means two things. And 
unless we are linguistic schizophrenics or willing to 
ignore half of what we read, a text which says and means 
two things must say and mean one complex thing" 
(1985,42). Van Dyke's argument posits a single complex 
meaning for allegorical writing in which the two levels 
of meaning are combined. In African Farm it seems rather 
that the universal meaning is constantly being troubled 
or undermined by the text itself. Her characters refuse 
the allegorical transmutation from agent to image, and 
the landscape, while promising a logic of its own, 
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nevertheless contains elements which signify a historical 
world of pain, struggle and contradiction. The symboli.;--i~ 
life of the allegorical form is at variance with the ___j 
material world it represents. 
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Part 3: Colonial Alleqory and the Limits of the Self 
In discussing the nature of allegory as a semantic 
device, Fletcher argues that it characteristically 
expresses conflict between rival authorities. He writes 
that "At the heart of any allegory will be found this 
conflict of authorities. One ideal is pitted against 
another, its opposite ••• " (1965,22). In African Farm, 
the narrative articulates this conflict of authorities at 
number of different levels. Most overtly, the novel 
represents the conflict between an old order based on 
religious belief and the new order of evolutionary 
science. This conflict is reP-resented in the most 
manifestly allegorical sections of the text, the chapter 
.-----------.~~__:::.--~~~~~~----~~~_:_~~~-=-~~~ 
entitled "Times and Seasons" and the tale told by Waldo's 
stranger. Yet beyond this very conscious desire to 
reorder people's perception of the world, the novel 
enters into conflict more covertly with two other 
authoritative systems. In the first part of the novel, 
Bonaparte Blenkins can be read as a figure of invasion, 
--~~~~--~--~----=~~~~ expression the arbitrary rule of violence and self-
interest which characterised the colonial enterprise. In 
the second part of the novel, Lyndall's interaction with 
the mirror seems to articulate the limits of identity as 
a means of social transformation and the ultimate failure 
of the indiv_i_ci_ualist self in the colonial context. 
Referring to Coleridge's distinction between symbol 
and allegory, Fletcher explains allegory's traditional 
association with reason: 
With Symbol the mind perceives the rational order of 
things directly, by an "unmediated vision", without 
any logical extrapolation from the phenomena of our 
material world, whereas in allegory there is always 
(as Coleridge sees it) an attempt to categorize 
logical orders first, and fit them to convenient 
phenomena second, to set forth ideal systems first 
and illustrate them second ... One need not 
necessarily be aware of one's own private motives in 
constructing such ideal systems, but one does need 
to have a conscious, highly organised view of the 
interrelationships that bind the system into a unity 
(1965,18). 
For Coleridge, allegory involves a highly conscious mode 
of analysis, in which an authoritative ordering of the 
-----r 
world is challenged by the presentation of an_~ternative 
---"ideal system". In the novel, the allegory of the hunter 
represents such a challenge of the traditional ordering 
of the world. It depicts the act of individual 
transformation from a religious doctrine of faith to a 
mystical striving after truth. 19 In the fable which the 
stranger tells, the hunter has to leave the community 
which he is part of in the "valley of superstition" and:.--
go on alone, resisting the temptation of the "twins 
sensuality" who try and divert him in "the Land of 
Absolute Negation and Denial", to climb the mountains of ,_____,. 
Q In the chapter "Times and Seasons" a similar movement 
s-e<ems to be in operation although the "truth" here is not 
depicted as an abstract goal but rather as the discovery 
of a natural order. After examining the internal organs 
of a gander, the narrator comes to the conclusion that: 
"This thing we call existence is it not something which 
has its roots far down below in the dark, and its 
branches stretching out into the immensity above, which 
we among the branches cannot see? Not a chance jumble; a 
living thing, a One" (1984,153). The truth here is 
embodied in the relation which exists between all natural 
phenomena. The material world indicates beyond itself to 
a hidden order. 
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"Dry-facts and Realities" at the top of which lives the 
bird of truth. Although the hunter fails to reach the 
bird his endeavour is justified because he has carved a 
path which will enable others to come closer to truth. 
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At the point of death he comments that: "Where I lie down 
worn out other men will stand young and fresh. By the 
steps that I have cut they will climb; by the stairs that 
I have built they will mount ••• They will find her, and 
through me! No man liveth to himself, and no man dieth to 
himself" (1984,168). The fable contains a clear 
evolutionary message. Individual mortality is 
transcended by the progress of society as a whole and 
this progress is achieved through the submission of the 
material world of hard facts and realities to an ordering 
principle. Scientific investigation rather than 
superstitious belief is represented as the means by which 
the ultimate "truth" may be discovered and the moral 
meaning of humanity's existence revealed. For Waldo's 
stranger, religous order is replaced by a moral order 
which is bound by natural laws. Nature rather than 
society is perceived as the source of moral 
consciousness, since, the stranger argues, "the 
inexorable 'thou shalt and shalt not' are carved into the 
nature of things" (1984,171). The scientific 
investigation of natural phenomena is perceived to 
constitute the real basis for a moral consciousness. 
This interpretation of the social Darwinist application 
of biology to social organisation reveals Schreiner's 
conscious revision of this theory in terms of her 
egalitarian and pacifist social beliefs. The "all-
knowing self" becomes "the one judge which deals eternal 
justice", suggesting that the exterior figure of God is 
replaced by an innate moral conscience within. 
The allegory of the hunter thus expresses the 
conscious conflict between an interpretation of the world 
based on religion and one based on a form of scientific 
naturalism. Although this new science is empirical it 
also indicates beyond the material data towards 
underlying principles. Nature replaces God as the 
ultimate authority, and aquires an almost mystical 
status. This opposition between a doctrine of faith and 
one based on empirical research represents perhaps the 
most significant ideological conflict of the nineteenth 
century. The religious subject, constrained by external 
laws of conduct and threatened by justice after death is 
succeeded by the individualist subject who is answerable 
only to a personal moral conscience. The allegory of the 
hunter can thus also be read as tracing the emergence of 
the individualist subject, the self searching for a 
personal meaning within an alienated world. 
Yet within the novel as a whole the allegorical mode 
operates also within the more material conflict between 
the colony and the metropolis. At this level allegory 
operates not as a conscious replacing of the one order by 
the other, but rather as an unconscious attempt to 
~ymbolize the colony in terms other than those prescibed 
for it by the metropolis. Coleridge's distinction 
between symbol and allegory disappears if allegory is 
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perceived not as a series of conscious correlations 
between two systems but rather as trope of transformation 
which brings together two opposing discursive fields. As 
Van Dyke has argued, the "movement of meaning" in an 
allegorical text involves a constant interaction between 
the different levels of signification. 
In African Farm Waldo's stranger articulates a 
conception of art in terms of the traditional definition 
of allegory: 
"How did you know it?" the boy whispered at last. 
"It is not written there - not on that wood. How did 
you know it?" 
"Certainly," said the stranger, "the whole 
story is not written here, but it is suggested. And 
the attribute of all true art, the highest and the 
lowest, is this - that it says more than it says, 
and takes you away from itself. It is a little door 
which opens into an infinite hall where you may find 
what you please" (1984,169). 
Here true art is conceptualized as having the power to 
indicate beyond itself to "an infinite hall". Art's 
/ 
importance lies in its ability to suggest something other 
than itself, an infinite significance from the finite 
material of the work. The stranger asserts that "there 
is nothing so universally intelligible as truth" 
{1984,169), suggesting that an essentially human truth, 
bound by its connection to nature, provides a connection 
between people which exceeds social divisions. Art 
provides access to a reality which transcends cultural 
barriers. For Schreiner, art, conceptualized in these 
terms became a way of relating the fractured colonial 
reality to the transcendence of a universal human truth. 
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Yet in the novel, there seem to be certain elements 
which resist this universalizing impulse. In the first 
part of the novel, the figure of Bonaparte Blenkins can 
be read as the counterpoint to the hero of an adventure 
romance. Bonaparte Blenkins can be seen to link the 
colonial farm to metropolitan interests. Gorak writes 
that: 
[Schreiner] equates colonization with unsettlement, 
and traces colonial unsettlement, not to the 
depredations of the surrounding natives, nor even to 
the greed of the colonists, but to cultural 
contradictions within the parent society. At one 
point, Blenkins moves, with the lightening quickness 
of the trickster figure, from a tale of colonial 
life as hairbreadth escapes from wild animals to a 
quintessential fable of colonial capitalism. "There 
is Africa, a struggling country; they want capital; 
they want men of talent ••• ! brought eight thousand 
pounds worth of machinery - winnowing, ploughing, 
reaping machines •••• Got to the Cape. Where is the 
ship with the things? Lost - gone to the bottom!" 
(1992,63). 
It is Blenkins' ability to gener~~e convincing narratives 
and manipulate existing ones which enables him to assume 
' 
control over the inhabitants of the farm. The first 
three chapters in which Blenkins appears, entitled "I 
was a stranger, and ye took me in", "Blessed is he that 
believeth" and "Sunday Services" all refer to the 
discourse of Christianity which he manipulates in order 
to undermine Otto's authority on the farm. Otto's 
belief, and his trusting acceptance of Blenkins's stories 
make him an easy victim. While Otto and Tant' Sannie are 
taken in by Blenkins, Waldo, Em and Lyndall are not, yet 
are powerless to prevent his schemes. Constrained by 
physical force, their resistance can only be a refusal of 
his narratives of legitimation. After Waldo has been 
whipped and locked in the fuel-room, Lyndall releases 
him: 
A flush rose to her face; she opened the door 
quickly, and walked in, went to the nail on which 
the key of the fuel-room hung. Bonaparte and Tant' 
Sannie sat there and saw her. 
"What do you want?" they asked together. 
"This key," she said, holding it up, and looking at 
them. 
"Do you mean her to have it?" said Tant' Sannie in 
Dutch. 
"Why don't you stop her?" asked Bonaparte in 
English. 
"Why don't you take it from her?" said Tant' Sannie. 
So they looked at each other, talking, while Lyndall 
walked to the fuel house with the key, her underlip 
bitten in. 
"Waldo," she said, as she helped him to stand up, 
and twisted his arm about her waist to support him, 
"we will not be children always; we shall have the 
power too, some day. 11 (1984,126-7) 
The first part of the novel is characterised by a 
combination of black humour and violence. The humorous 
spectacle of Blenkins in no way detracts from the horror 
of the violence that he inflicts, both physically and 
psychologically. Its force lies not in its realistic 
representation of the actual conditions of colonialism 
but rather in the way it explores the complex interaction 
between narrative and violence in Blenkins' arrogation of 
power. He finds in Africa, like the hero of the romance, 
a space of relative freedom in which stable social 
relationships do not exist. .'.!'_~e isolation of the farm 
from established structures of civil society makes it an 
ideal domain for an individual to enact the fantasy of 





Bonaparte Blenkins, unlike the hero of the adventure 
story is represented as overtly opportunistic, 
manipulating the inhabitants through a combination of 
often contradictory narratives of colonial legitimation 
and violence. Blenkins represents the traveller from 
the parent society not in the metropolitan's terms as a 
heroic figure of eternal humanity but as an agent of 
exploitation, constituted by the diverse stories he tells 
to justify h~s assumption of power. Although Blenkins is 
finally defeated by his own opportunism, and disappears 
from the narrative in the second part of the novel, he --
serves to focus the ~Citure o_f-power in _the nov:~]__, "not_ as~ 
- __ ,,. =- - ·- c 7 - ·- - ·-, ~ -· ~· ~· 
a form of absolute authority but as strategic::::_controi,. 
r·-··~. 
The other figure in the novel who seem unable to 
transcend the specificity of her position, is, of course, 
Lyndall. If Waldo is linked through a form of universal 
consciousness to the animate natural order, Lyndall 
remains entirely within the limits of a social 
consciousness. This distinction between them is made 
clear early on in the novel. 
"And the wild buck have gone, and those days, and we 
are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the 
stones will lie on here, looking at everything like 
they look now. I know it is I who am thinking," the 
fellow added slowly, "but it seems as though it were 
they who were talking. Has it never seemed so to 
you, Lyndall?" 
"No, it never seems so to me," she answered. 
( 1984 I 50) 
Lyndall's unequivocal answer to Waldo's question seems to 
institute an absolute division between the way each are 
situated in relation to the world which is reinforced 
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later in the novel. After her return from boarding 
school, Lyndall asks Waldo whether he takes an interest 
in "the position of women". His equally unequivocal 
negative reply suggests that the two position marked by 
these two characters are incompatible. Waldo's interest 
in the universal mysteries of the world preclude him from 
a concern with the particular social conditions of women. 
According to Barash, Schreiner considered both Lyndall 
and Waldo to be representations of herself20 . This 
divided expression of the self seems to suggest that the 
social reality of her gender conflicted with her belief 
in the unifying power of the natural order. Waldo's 
death, unlike Lyndall's death which is marked by the fear 
of the "Grey Dawn", is preceded by his recognition of the 
meaningfulness of nature: 
Ah, to live on so, year after year, how well! 
Always in the present; letting each day glide, 
bringing its own labour, and its own beauty; the 
gradual lighting up of the hills, night and the 
stars, firelight and the coals! To live on so, 
calmly, far from the paths of men; and to look at 
the lives of clouds and insects; to look deep into 
the heart of flowers, and see how lovingly the 
pistil and the stamens nestle there together, and to 
see in the thorn-pods how the little seeds suck 
their life through the delicate curled up string, 
and how the little embryo sleeps inside (1984,299). 
Waldo's final reconciliation is with a natural order but 
significantly one which excludes "man". It represents a 
' final retreat from the social world and ultimately an 
ending point for Waldo as subject. In the text both 
Lyndall and Waldo, as individual subjects seem to reach a 
20. Carol Barash writes that "Schreiner told her two 
brothers that the two central characters, Lyndall and 
Waldo, were both herself ... "(1989,272). 
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final barrier, a point beyond which they cannot go. I 
have suggested that figure of Bonaparte Blenkins, can be 
read as the reversal of the heroic adventurer. In a 
similar way, I wish to suggest that Waldo and Lyndall, 
mark the limits of the individualist subject of the 
realist text in the colonial situation. 
The problem of both mimetic realism and the 
adventure story is not only that they cannot represent 
the discontinuities of colonial reality. In both forms 
although in different ways, the central element in the 
narrative is the constitution of a coherent and unified 
subject. The knowing subject of realist discourse and 
the invulnerable subject of the colonial adventure are 
both constructed according to a principle of reflection. 
If the realist text claims to reflect the world as it is, 
the adventure story operates in the realm of wish-
fulfillment to produce an image of fantasied wholeness 
and autonomy which reproduces the child's first encounter 
with him/herself in the mirror. In his account of 
Lacan's analysis of the constitution of the individual as 
subject, Stuart Schneiderman describes the mirror stage 
as the first moment at which the child comes to recognise 
his/her own self as a separate entity in relation to the 
exterior world. He writes that: 
The child does not merely see his image in the 
mirror. He sees the image surrounded by the world 
of objects. The world is certainly integrated with 
the ego; the ego as image at its centre. This 
integration is effected only at the cost of a 
misapprehension: the ego may be thought of as the 
subjective centre of the world; in fact it is the 
first object of the child's look. 
We must add 
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that when the child first recognises his image in 
the mirror, he greets the discovery with jubilation. 
He is transfixed by the image; he is fixated, even 
captured, by its immobility as well as its 
wholeness. In a sense the child will invest his 
image narcissistically because it responds or 
appears to respond unfailingly to his cues. This is 
again a misapprehension of the fact that he himself 
has been captured within the field of the mirror. 
(1980,4) 
This fantasied relation of identity with the image in the 
mirror is one which is inevitably interrupted by the 
child's accession to language, but the mirror image 
remains as a model of the ego function. Read in these 
terms realist fiction can be regarded as engaging the 
knowing subject in a stucture of fulfilling 
misrecognition. The place of the knowing subject is 
confirmed through an organisation of the real which 
places the reader, like the child in the mirror, at the 
subjective centre of an integrated world.e .. The adventure 
novel, operating at the level of fantasy, involves a 
misrecognition of a different kind. In the image of the 
autonomous and invulnerable hero the reader can find a 
reconstitution of the unified self. The fact that this 
hero is conceived of as representing the "eternally 
human" makes it possible for the reader to reconfirm 
his/her own self through a fantasied identification with 
the protagonist. The otherness of the colonial world 
makes it an ideal space for the working out of these 
narcissistic wishes for a reality which will respond 
unfailingly to the will of the ego. The reader is thus 
in both cases confirmed as subject through reference back 
to the moment of perceived wholeness which the imaginary 
58 
59 
represents. In refusing both realist and adventure 
forms, Schreiner can be read as attempting to resist the ~ 
structures of identity implicit in any narrative which 
operates within the field of the mirror. These 
structures position the subject within a reflective 
relation to the world and to itself and in doing so 
constitute identity within a closed circle of 
recognition. Yet to escape this capture and articulate a 
subjectivity outside the terms of recognition determined 
by the historical and social frame of reference involves 
a confrontation with the very possibilty of subjectivity 
itself. In the novel, the difficulties of escaping this 
reflective subjectivity are articulated through the 
figure of Lyndall. 
Lyndall, whose final gesture is to meet her own eyes 
in the mirror, seems to be at once captured by the mirror 
and at the same time empowered by it to constitute a self 
outside of the identities prescribed for her. In her 
conversation with Waldo about the position of women, 
Lyndall comments on the process whereby the young girl 
comes to see herself in the way prescribed for her by 
society. Having been prevented from going out to play, 
she watches from inside the house: 
Afterwards we go and thread blue beads, and make a 
string for our neck; and we go and stand before the 
glass. We see the complexion we were not to spoil, 
and the white frock, and we look into our own great 
eyes. Then the curse begins to act on us. It 
finishes its work when we are grown women, who no 
more look out wistfully at a more healthy life; we 
are contented (1984,189). 
Unlike the Lacanian mirror in which the child 
misapprehends itself as whole and finds itself situated 
at the centre of an integrated world, Lyndall's child, 
already subjected to language, finds in the mirror not an 
imaginary wholeness but rather the fragmentation of 
gendered identity. She begins to see herself in the 
terms set out by those around her - 'the complexion we 
were not to spoil' and 'the white frock'. The image of 
feminine identity which the mirror returns is one which 
is defined in terms of appearance rather than action. 
The curse which consigns them to their position is the 
one which prevents them from making a distinction between 
image and self so that they finally become what they are 
expected to be. The action of looking in the mirror is 
presented as an alternative to the world of action 
represented by the boys playing out of doors, and its 
function at this point is normative, encouraging the 
child to recognise herself in the terms set out by the 
society. But there is another look operating in this 
extract which does not contribute to the certification of 
feminine identity. The child looks into her own eyes and 
establishes a relationship with herself which is one of 
doubleness not identity. This doubleness becomes central 
to Lyndall's own resistance to identity imposed by the 
image of femininity: 
The large dark eyes from the glass looked back at 
her. She looked deep into them. 
'We are all alone, you 
and I,' she whispered; 'no one helps us, no one 
understands us; but we will help ourselves.' The 
eyes looked back at her. There was a world of 
assurance in their still depths. So they had looked 
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at her ever since she could remember, when it was 
but a small child's face above a blue pinafore. 'We 
will never be quite alone, you and I,' she said; 'we 
will always be together, as we were when we were 
little.' {1984,242) 
The use of the definite article rather than the personal 
pronoun to introduce the phrase ref erring to the eyes 
causes a radical and disturbing division between Lyndall 
and her reflected eyes. Kathleen Blake notes that this 
absence of the personal pronoun in Schreiner's 
descriptions of Lyndall's relation to her body is a 
common _feature and one which can be contrasted with the 
treatment of Waldo who is not subjected to the same 
depersonalisation. She suggests that: "The choice of 
'its' for 'her', 'the little figure' for 'her little 
figure', let alone her proper name, implies separation, 
objectification, a view of woman not as a self-
integrating entity but as-· a ""coilection" '()f-unpossessed 
parts, not 'I' enough to personalize the pronouns" 
(1983,219). Yet in the passage quoted above the 
reflected eyes which meet Lyndall's eyes in the mirror 
provide a "world of assurance". Lyndall, alone because 
her desires place her outside the social order, completes 
herself with this look, gaining from it the reassurance 
that she requires to embark upon the action of redefining 
her position in relation to the normative social reality. 
It is a doubleness which enables her to escape the static 
identity prescribed for her by a femininity def°ined by a 
complexion which is not to be spoiled and a white frock. 
Looking into her own eyes becomes a way of not seeing her 
image as it has been constructed for her by her position 
as a woman. 
Yet at the same time as this gesture makes it 
possible for her to resist the discourse which positions 
her as simply image, it also excludes from her gaze, a 
world both geographical and social in which she could 
orient herself. If the mirror is conceived of as 
returning not only the image of the person before it but 
also placing that person in relation to a visible world, 
present to consciousness through the agency of 
perception, Lyndall's refusal to look further than her 
own gaze displaces her from any relation to her immediate 
surroundings. This alienation from the landscape both 
geographical and social locks her into a relation which 
can only ever contain herself. At the old German's 
grave, after she has agreed to leave with the stranger, 
she says "'I am so tired. There is light, there is 
warmth,' she wailed; 'why am I alone, so hard, so cold? 
I am so weary of myself! It is eating my soul to its core 
- self, self, self! I cannot bear this life! I cannot 
breath, I cannot live! Will nothing free me from 
myself?" (1984,241) 
Resisting the version of reality she inhabits by 
refusing to situate herself within its visible frame 
reenacts the powerlessness of women in relation to the 
world which surrounds them. In her conversation with 
Waldo she makes the distinction between man and woman 
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precisely this aspect of their social construction: 
We all enter the world little plastic beings, with 
so much natural force, perhaps but for the rest -
blank; and the world tells us what we are to be, and 
shapes us by the ends it sets before us. To you it 
says - Work! and to us it says Seem! (1984,188) 
Work while it does not ultimately provide Waldo with a 
way of redeeming his world, nevertheless offers a mode of 
interaction with the environment which is, or could be, 
productive. 21 In contrast to this interactive position, 
women are given the role of appearing, their visibility 
in the eyes of others becoming what defines them. 
Lyndall in attempting to organise a space for 
herself outside the bounds of the constraining social 
order meets her own eyes in the mirror and addresses 
them. She finds in this doubleness the space to conceive 
of a self which would be able to "fight", to resist the 
position to which she has been assigned. Yet to do this 
she has to become both the "I" and the "you" of her 
discourse. If, as Benveniste implies, it is precisely in 
this contrast between persons that a consciousness of 
self becomes possible Lyndall's position is a precarious 
one. Not only does she exclude from her discourse the 
possibility of a real interlocuter, thus evading the 
challenge of the colonial reality, she also becomes a 
subject only by virtue of the contrast she has set up 
21. Waldo's sheep-shearing machine, although it is 
crushed by Bonaparte Blenkins before it can be completed, 
does offer him a meaningful way of interacting with the 
world. His striving ends in nothing not because the 
machine is inherently unproductive but because Waldo is 
subject to the physical tyranny of Bonaparte Blenkins. 
(1984,106-107) 
with herself; being both "I" and "you" she can only ever 
speak in the enclosed space of her own self. 
In his discussion of Lacan's theory of 
consciousness, Manfred Frank writes that "the true 
subject has to do with articulation; and the function of 
the imaginary subject consists in permeating in the space 
of fiction the primal separation that consciousness 
experiences in articulation. The wound inflicted by the 
symbolization of the j_g 4is imaginarily healed in a 
vision, indeed, in the image of the moi that is identical 
with what it faces" (1989,300). ·In Schreiner's novel the 
image of the "moi" does not fulfill the function of an 
imaginary recuperation of the fractured "I". Lyndall's 
relationship to her image in the mirror is not one of 
identity but rather one of difference, since through 
looking into her own eyes she opens up a discursive space 
in which she attempts to redefine her position as that of 
subject. The "moi" is not identical with what it faces 
but is divided by the surface of the mirror reproducing 
the split which it was meant to conceal. In the text, 
the mirror does not offer the possibility of an imaginary 
identification which would constitute the subject as 
whole but rather reveals the doubleness of the reflective 
subject. This doubleness, while it prevents the 
constitution of an imaginary subject, cannot in reality 
transform the imaged self into the subject of 
articulation since it remains within the logic of the 
mirror. The impossibility of Lyndall's position is thus 
that she remains captured by a reflection which divides 
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her without allowing her to adopt the position -of subject 
of articulation. She cannot speak precisely because she 
cannot escape the imaginary realm of the mirror although 
she refuses its identities. In her conversation with 
Waldo she says in response to his suggestion that she 
should speak that "I will do nothing good for myself, 
nothing for the world, till someone wakes me. I am 
asleep, swathed, shut up in self; till I have been 
delivered I will deliver no one" (1984,196). A third 
term is needed in order for her to be able to break this 




The conception of the self proposed by Lyndall's 
interaction with the mirror is at once divided, and 
liberated through this division and trapped, caught 
within the logic of the imaginary. Her directed gaze 
does not allow the mirror to reconstitute her as a 
unified whole. She sees only the eyes, not the completed 
body framed by its material surroundings. The mirror's 
surface remains present as the line of division which 
splits the image from what it reflects. 
On one side of the mirror there is thus the material 
body. For Schreiner this is not, as Spencer would have 
it, the body as machine, fulfilling its biological 
function. Nor is it the invulnerable body of the 
adventure hero or the embodied self of the realist 
narrative. It is instead a body fragmented and 
incomplete, subject to pain, distortion and destruction. 
on the other side of the mirror the image promises to 
bring together these divided parts. 
The text's refusal to allow the mirror to fulfill 
this promise, to heal the divided self through the 
fantasy of wholeness, suggests that this imaged self has 
no place in the material reality Schreiner is 
representing. The reality she depicts, as she comments 
in her preface to African Farm, is a world in flux, 
something which is neither predictable nor wholly 
explicable. Schreiner's choice of allegory can thus be 
read as an attempt both to maintain and transcend the 
fractures of such a project. 
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Like the reflection in the mirror, the hidden 
meaning in allegory promises some ultimate truth, some 
revelation which will transform the pain and 
fragmentation of material reality. The actual text of 
the fable, like the material body, needs to be subjected 
to an interpretative logic, in order for it to reveal its 
secret coherence. In order for the allegorical truth to 
be decoded, it must like the mirror· image be decoded 
according to some logic of recognition. Allegory, unlike 
the realist or adventure mode, achnowledges the division 
which the act of representation introduces but it wishes 
to grant to the underlying meaning the power to 
recuperate the fabled text and the world it represents. 
Yet as I have argued, in Schreiner•s allegorical writing 
the material world refuses to be subordinated to some 
underlying unity. Its resistancemarks-'iler~narratives as 
acts of struggle in which her own self is deeply 
implicated. Schreiner's writing can thus be read as an 
attempt to forge through expression a position for 
colonial subject which could not be found prior to 
expression. For Schreiner, writing is not a means of ~ 
healing the fractures of the real. Instead, I would 
argue it represents a struggle to symbolise a new and as 
yet undeciphered social, political and geographical 
configuration, a form of cognitive mapping which is not 
the establishment of fixed borders but the recognition of 
a world in flux. 
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